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Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Price of Non-Cooperation
by Ole Solvang*

I

Chechnya pending before the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Russian
government has refused to provide the ECtHR with important documents. Recent cases indicate that Russia might be punished for its non-cooperation, but that there are limits to how far
the ECtHR is willing to go toward enforcement.

Chechnya and the European Court of Human Rights
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has
struggled with a violent separatist movement in its southern
republic of Chechnya. An initial military attempt to bring
Chechnya back into Russia’s fold met with embarrassing failure. As a result, Russia’s then President Boris Yeltsin signed
a peace agreement with his Chechen counterpart in 1996, giving Chechnya de facto independence. After a series of apartment bombings, officially attributed to Chechen terrorists and
a Chechen armed incursion into the neighboring republic of
Dagestan, Russia’s central government launched a second military campaign in 1999.
The so-called second Chechen war was characterized by
widespread grave human rights abuses. Indiscriminate use of
deadly force, torture, and extra-judicial killings became regular
occurrences for Chechnya’s civilian population. Federal military
forces regularly carried out cleansing operations (zachistki),
during which they surrounded and isolated populated areas
for several days to check the inhabitants’ identity documents.
During these operations civilians regularly disappeared, never to
be seen again. As the military conflict has subsided, large-scale
cleansing operations have been replaced by identity checks by
armed, masked men at night. These checks often lead to disappearances. Human rights organizations estimate that 5,000
people may have disappeared in Chechnya since 1999 at the
hands of military and security forces. Human Rights Watch calls
the widespread practice of disappearances in Chechnya a crime
against humanity.1
Perpetrators of these violations have enjoyed virtual impunity. Since 1999 there have been only a handful of convictions
for grave human rights violations in Chechnya. Only one individual has been convicted for a disappearance-related crime.2
While human rights violations were also widespread during
the first Chechen war, Russia’s 1998 ratification of the European
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) provided victims of the second war with a powerful new tool for seeking
redress for human rights violations — the ECtHR. As a result of
Russia’s ratification, the ECtHR obtained jurisdiction to review
violations of the Convention in Russia, including Chechnya, that
have taken place since May 1998.
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The second Chechen War was characterized by widespread human
rights abuses against the civilian population.

Consequently, several hundred victims from Chechnya have
submitted applications to the ECtHR.3 Since the ECtHR handed
down its first judgment in a Chechen case,4 Russia has lost, on
some or all counts, in 24 cases concerning grave human rights
abuses in Chechnya.5 Russia was obliged to effectively investigate the violations and hold the perpetrators accountable, pay
monetary compensation to the victims, and undertake measures
to prevent similar violations from recurring. However, access
to documents held by Russia for criminal investigations has
become a contentious issue.

Furnishing all necessary facilities?
Although it can conduct oral hearings and fact-finding missions, the ECtHR decides the majority of its cases solely on
the basis of written submissions. Through several exchanges
throughout the multi-year procedure of bringing a case to the
ECtHR, both the applicants and the respondent state file submissions, respond to each other’s arguments and submit supporting
evidence.
States’ obligation to cooperate with the ECtHR is described
in Article 38 of the Convention, which states that the ECtHR
shall “pursue the examination of the case, together with the
representatives of the parties, and if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the States concerned
shall furnish all necessary facilities.”6 This usually means that
the state in question is under an obligation to provide the ECtHR
with documents that contain information relevant to the case.
The ECtHR has previously been critical of Turkey regarding
its Article 38 compliance. In several cases concerning violations
in the context of security force operations, the Turkish authorities failed to disclose documents relating either to the operations
themselves or to the subsequent investigation. More recently,
however, Article 38 concerns have surfaced in cases against
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Russia, and particularly in cases concerning human rights violations in Chechnya.
In most cases from Chechnya pending before the ECtHR,
evidence suggests that representatives of the authorities were
involved in disappearances, torture, or extra-judicial executions.
In some cases, Russian authorities initially admitted to detaining
an individual, but later denied it after the person disappeared,
or claimed that they had been released.7 Furthermore, accused
perpetrators often travel in heavily armed military vehicles that
only the authorities possess, and freely travel through heavily
guarded checkpoints after curfew.
Russian authorities employ several lines of defense, often
claiming there is insufficient evidence to prove government
involvement. They also allege that rebel fighters disguised as
federal forces perpetrate these crimes. In most cases, they argue
that a criminal investigation is still ongoing and it would therefore be premature for the ECtHR to pass a judgment in the case.
In all Chechen cases, the ECtHR requests that the Russian
authorities submit a copy of the criminal case file. Access to
these documents assists the ECtHR in establishing the facts in
the case and allows the ECtHR to properly assess whether the
investigation has been effective. Such access is particularly
important in certain types of cases. In cases regarding allegations of unacknowledged detention and/or enforced disappearances, often only the respondent state has access to information
capable of corroborating or refuting applicants’ allegations that
their rights have been violated.
The Russian government consistently refuses to provide the
ECtHR with the requested documents. Referring to Article 161
of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, Russian authorities often argue that disclosure of documents from the case file
would compromise the federal investigation and could violate
the rights and legitimate interests of the participants in the criminal proceedings.8 They also argue that the requested documents
contain state and military secrets, and that the authorities do not
trust the applicants and their representatives to keep the information confidential.9 The authorities usually invite the ECtHR
to review documents not containing military or state secrets in
Russia, without rights to make copies.10
Several times the ECtHR has rejected Russian authorities’
arguments against the disclosure of documents. The ECtHR has
noted that Russian authorities can invoke the ECtHR’s Rule 33,
which would prevent the documents from being public, if they
believe that disclosure of information would be to the detriment of the investigation. In addition, the ECtHR has noted that
Russian authorities have been inconsistent in their use of Article
161. In several cases, authorities have submitted documents
from the criminal case file.11
Faced with the government’s refusal to provide the necessary documents, the ECtHR has several options to apply pressure. The ECtHR has, in several cases, drawn inferences as to
the validity of applicants’ allegations. In the case Imakayeva v.
Russia, the ECtHR drew inferences from the Russian authorities’ refusal to provide the necessary documents to hold that the
authorities were responsible for the illegal detention and disappearance of Marzet Imakayeva’s son.12
Another option is to hold that the Russian authorities have
not “furnished all necessary facilities,” and have thereby violated Article 38 of the Convention. Finding a violation of Article
38 can sometimes generate additional negative publicity for the

respondent state, and at least one ECtHR judge believes that
repeated Article 38 violations should lead to higher monetary
awards for the applicants.
The ECtHR generally employs one of these options, but
the Russian authorities have not suffered significant negative
consequences from their refusal to provide case files. Recent
ECtHR judgments in two Chechen cases, however, show that
the ECtHR is willing to increase pressure on the Russian government, but only to a certain point.

Putting on the Pressure
On January 1, 2000, after a period of heavy shelling, Russian
special police forces (OMON) moved into the area where
Zaynap Abdul-Vagapovna Tangiyeva and her relatives lived in
the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny, Chechnya. Relations
between civilians and police forces soon became tense as police
forces regularly carried out identity checks, ordered civilians
to collect dead bodies, and selected men for “exchange” with
the fighters. On one specific occasion, a drunk OMON officer
threatened to open fire on all civilians.
On January 11, 2000, during a daily check on her relatives,
Tangiyeva discovered that her father’s house was burning. She

“At least one judge
believes that repeated
Article 38 violations —
refusing to provide the
Court with documents
containing relevant information — should lead to
higher monetary awards
for the applicants.”
found her father’s and a neighbor’s dead bodies in the kitchen,
both with gunshot wounds to the head. The charred remains
of her mother and uncle were later found in the basement.
Frustrated by the authorities’ unwillingness to investigate the
killings, Tangiyeva lodged an application with the ECtHR in
April 2000, arguing that federal servicemen had killed her relatives.
Tangiyeva’s application referred to several additional violations in the same region and time period. In previous cases, the
ECtHR held that Russian federal forces controlled the area and
had committed grave human rights violations.13 The Tangiyeva
case, however, contained less concrete evidence that Russian
15
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case, a dissenting opinion from two judges. The Russian and
Azerbaijani judges argued that the majority had gone too far,
and that there was not enough evidence to hold Russian authorities responsible for the killings. Beyond the Tangiyeva case,
the most recent judgment in a Chechen case demonstrates that
there are limits to how far the majority is willing to go in this
direction.

Taking the Pressure Off?
On September 17, 2000, loud screams woke the Zubayrayev
family. According to the testimony of Malika Zubayrayeva,
a large group of men in camouflage uniforms and, in some
instances, masks, wearing the Russian army’s insignia and
speaking Russian without an accent, entered the house and
forced everyone outside. When the soldiers left, they took
Mailka’s husband with them. Shortly thereafter he was found
dead with a gunshot wound to the back of the head. Investigators
arrived at the scene several hours later, but according to the
family, they were rude and did not interview anyone about the
incident. The family did not subsequently report the incident,
reasoning it would probably receive the same treatment. Several
months later the family left Russia out of concern for their security and lodged an application with the ECtHR.
In the course of the ECtHR proceedings, the Russian government claimed that illegal armed groups committed the killing,
referring to several other killings that night, including that of
a local police officer. One person was charged with the crime,
but was later released because he had confessed under duress.
The authorities refused to provide the ECtHR with the entire
criminal case file. They eventually submitted approximately 50
of 300 documents.
In its judgment of January 10, 2008, the ECtHR again held
that it could both draw inferences from the authorities’ refusal to
provide the entire case file and that the authorities had violated
Article 38 by not providing the necessary documents.17
Unlike in Tangiyeva, however, the ECtHR did not find that it
could hold the authorities responsible for the killing. Attempting
to distinguish the Zubayrayev case from other Chechen cases,
the judges referred to two elements. First, the judges considered that there was less evidence in Zubayrayev to implicate
government forces. Second, the judges emphasized that the
applicants had never communicated their version of the events
to the authorities. The ECtHR also noted that from the outset the
Russian criminal investigation had operated under the idea that
illegal insurgents committed the crime.
Again the judgment prompted dissenting opinions, this time
from the judges from Cyprus and Luxemburg. Judges Loucaides
and Spielmann argued that the applicants had made a prima
facie case, and they took issue with the majority’s reference to
an investigation that the ECtHR had already found to be ineffective.

The Russian government has blocked European Court requests for
documents sought in connection with Chechens’ claims.

federal forces were responsible for the violations, and there were
no direct eyewitnesses to the killings.
To establish the facts of the case, the ECtHR judges considered the documents from the criminal case crucial, and twice
requested that the Russian authorities submit them. Although
Russian authorities submitted a number of procedural documents, they refused to submit any of the collected witness statements or other important procedural documents, such as descriptions of the sites or results of the ballistic expert reports, arguing
that disclosure would be detrimental to the ongoing federal
investigation.14
In response, the ECtHR found that the Russian authorities
had violated Article 38 of the Convention. In addition, it drew
affirmative inferences as to the validity of Tangiyeva’s allegations from the authorities’ refusal. The ECtHR determined that
the applicant had made a prima facie case that federal military
forces killed her relatives. The ECtHR further noted that when
the government prevents the ECtHR from reaching factual
conclusions by failing to submit requested documents, the
burden falls on the government to argue conclusively why the
documents in question would not corroborate the applicants’
allegations. In the alternative it may provide a satisfactory and
convincing explanation of how the events in question occurred.
The burden of proof is thus shifted to the government, and if it
fails, issues will arise concerning the substance of the complaint.
As the Russian government, in the ECtHR’s opinion, failed to
provide such an explanation, the ECtHR held that the applicant’s relatives’ deaths could be attributed to the State.15
On November 29, 2007, the ECtHR held that the Russian
authorities were responsible for the killing of the applicant’s
relatives; that they had not conducted an effective investigation;
that the indifference that they showed towards Tangiyeva constitutes inhuman treatment; that Tangiyeva had had no effective
remedies for these violations; and that the Russian authorities
had failed to “furnish all necessary facilities.” The ECtHR
awarded EUR 60.000 to Tangiyeva.16
Though the compensation did not differ substantially from
previous Chechen cases, criticism of the authorities’ non-cooperation seemed stronger and the ECtHR seemed more willing to
draw inferences in the Tangiyeva case. This increased willingness to draw inferences prompted, for the first time in a Chechen

The price of non-cooperation
Access to documents from domestic criminal investigations
has been a contentious issue in all cases from Chechnya, and
unless Russian authorities change their position, this issue will
continue to cause friction between the ECtHR and the Russian
authorities in future cases.
Both the Tangiyeva judgment and the Zubayrayev judgment
are not yet final. It is likely that the Russian authorities will try
16
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Zubayrayev case. If the ECtHR had had access to all case documents it may have found differently. In that case, the Zubayrayev
judgment undermined the strong stance in Tangiyeva, and
Russian authorities will be encouraged to continue to withhold
documents that might implicate the government. Such a situation is obviously problematic for the ECtHR, and the dissenting
opinions in both cases demonstrate that the judges themselves
have not reached a consensus on how to solve this problem.
If judges are unwilling to punish the government for its
non-cooperation by finding substantive violations, an alternative punishment could be to increase the compensation that the
government must pay. Increasing the pressure on the Russian
authorities to provide the ECtHR with important documents,
however, is crucial for the effective protection of the rights
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights.
Allowing the Russian authorities to withhold vital documents
from the ECtHR without any serious consequences would significantly undermine the ECtHR’s legitimacy, and ultimately
erode the protection of the rights of those who the ECtHR is
supposed to protect, such as the Chechens.
HRB

to appeal the Tangiyeva judgment, and it is possible that the
applicant might appeal the Zubayrayev judgment. If these judgments are not overturned, they provide an indication of how the
ECtHR will deal with this issue in the future. The Tangiyeva
judgment demonstrates that the Russian authorities will pay
a price for non-cooperation with the ECtHR: if applicants
present a prima facie case, and the authorities refuse to provide
requested documents without a proper explanation, the Russian
authorities will likely lose the case.
The Zubayrayev judgment, however, shows that there is a
limit as to how far the ECtHR is willing to go in this direction.
The judges seem to agree that the burden of proof shifts if the
applicants make a prima facie case and the government has
information that might corroborate or refute the allegations. If
the Zubayrayev judgment becomes final, key issues in future
cases will be determining what constitutes a prima facie case,
and what is needed for the burden of proof to shift to the respondent state.
Russian authorities may have benefited from their refusal to
provide the ECtHR with documents from the investigation in the
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